Dissemination and Reterritorialization: Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and the Renovation of Contemporary Confucian Philosophy

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Abstract
Confucianism as a mode of life was brought to Taiwan as early as Chinese settlement. Regarding Confucian philosophy, however, it must be traced back to the founding of modern institutions. Even though the historical background of the Chinese diaspora after 1949 is rather complex, it seems possible to examine how it has contributed to the development of academic disciplines in Taiwan, especially with regard to Confucianism. The present paper investigates the corresponding contributions of two philosophers, Tang Junyi (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan (1909–1995). Both are important scholars, who are indispensable for the development of contemporary intellectual history in Taiwan. In order to describe the creativity in their way of dealing with ruptures, of transforming the separation into the renovation of tradition, the author analyses their efforts in terms of geo-philosophy, through the lens of two concepts, dissemination and reterritorialization, that are borrowed from Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari.

Keywords: Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Taiwanese philosophy, Confucianism, cultural identity, diaspora

Diseminacija in reteritorializacija: Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan in preporod sodobne konfucijanske filozofije

Izvleček

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Introduction

Philosophy, pronounced in Mandarin *zhe-xue* or in Taiwanese *Téh-Ha’eh*, is evidently different from the original Greek term of *philosophia*. The introduction of the philosophical discipline in Asia opened a new era of cultural encounter by way of translation; but it also encouraged modern Chinese thinkers to identify their own tradition of thoughts as “philosophical”, with an effort which is no less than an invention of tradition. The philosophical discourses in the modern Chinese language entail at the same time a double translation, that is, in an interlingual manner, from Greek, Latin, Arabic, German, French, and others, sometimes via Japanese, into Chinese, and, in an intralingual manner, from Ancient to Modern Chinese. With its foreign origins, the term “philosophy” should be understood as enveloping a heterogeneous set of ideas in addressing Chinese thought.

To speak of Taiwanese philosophy makes things more complicated. Because the choice of the term is not limited to the sole gesture of adding the adjective “Taiwanese”, but also involves historical and geographical deviation. Historically, the island of Formosa had its own indigenous people with Austronesian lineage who stayed primitive without a modern form of civilization until relatively recently. The first contact with the modern European world was through the short Spanish and Dutch colonies in the early 17th century. Despite some Han settlements in restricted areas, the Chinese regime really began in the late 17th century, first under Ming loyalist Cheng and then under the Manchu dynasty until 1895. Japan had sent expeditioners to occupy Chinese settlements on the island in the 16th century, but only settled it as a colony as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese war. The era of Japanese colonial rule demarcates the start of the modern period in Taiwan, with the same standards applied as in other parts of the Meiji Empire. It was only after World War II that Taiwan returned to Chinese rule. The year 1949 is crucial here, as the Nationalist government was defeated in the civil war on the Mainland and retreated to its “temporary” capital of Taipei. A new identity was thus established through the coexistence of Chinese refugees from all
provinces with the earlier Chinese arrivals along with the aboriginal population. Geographically, the island with, its Peng-hu archipelago, faces Fu-Jian province at the margin of the Pacific basin, part of a chain of islands with the Philippines in the south and Okinawa, Japan in the north. During the Cold War, Taiwan was seen as a key link in this chain to prevent the expansion of communism. Situated between the ocean and the continent, the island has long been a place of exchange, between the East and West, North and South.

Due to its historical and geographical characteristics, the unique situation of Taiwan has affected philosophy on the island. As such, it would be better to see philosophy in Taiwan as a hybrid product of heterogeneous factors: the Chinese language as the dominant cultural identity, an American standard of academic activities, the Japanese influence imposing a colonial memory, as well as opening “a window to the world”, and European heritage as source of knowledge. Within this one can see ruptures and connections in the effort to integrate diverse traditions. Moreover, the resulting hybridity explains the mode of existence of this island in the contemporary world.

Confucianism as a mode of life was brought into the island as early as the first Chinese settlement. But in a philosophical context it’s better traced to the establishment of modern institutions. Despite the complicated historical background, it seems possible to examine how the Chinese diaspora after 1949, as a geographical factor, has contributed to the discipline in Taiwan, especially with regard to Confucianism. Two philosophers in particular, Tang Junyi (1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) are significant for the contemporary history of philosophy in Taiwan. In order to describe the creativity in their way of dealing with ruptures, of transforming the separation into the renovation of tradition, I will in this work examine their efforts with regard to geophilosophy with the use of two concepts, dissemination and reterritorialization, borrowed from Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari.

From Diaspora to Resettlement

As representatives of the second generation of contemporary Confucianism, the early years of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan were marked by the Sino-Japanese war and then Chinese civil war. Since the victory of Chinese Communist Party in the latter pushed them to leave their homeland, their philosophical testimonies are closely related to this catastrophe. Tang retreated to Hong Kong, a British colony at that time, and founded New Asia College with the renowned historian Chien Mu 錢穆. Mou spent a decade in Taiwan after his exile from the Mainland,
and then two decades in Hong Kong as colleague of Tang before returned to Tai-
pei in his last years.

In his preface to *Moral Idealism* (1982b), Mou writes of these ruptures as cata-
strophic. In contrast to his sense of impotence when dealing with the political
reality, he feels more power in engaging in a philosophical diagnosis of the intel-
lectual disease that he feels has befallen China in modern times. The big change
from the Republican regime to the Communist one caused a personal trauma that
required transformative self-therapy. Mou thus proposes restoring Confucianism,
and recovering the lineage of the Dao 道統 that had been ruined in Communist
China. By ascribing to this cultural ideal, his therapy is no less collective than it
is personal.

Mou’s academic reputation was established by such landmark works as *Talent and
*Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy* (1980), and *Buddha Nature and Prajñā*
(1997). Covering Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, the main problematic in
Mou’s works is not a search for one interpretation of the history of Chinese phi-
losophy among many others, but a quasi-response to the problem of culture that
Mou encountered in his times. The Kantian term “intellectual intuition”, referring
to shared, core wisdom prevalent to all three doctrines, is not only used by Mou
to criticize Kant, but also to reflect his personal feelings. Mou’s *Autobiography at
Fifty*, written around 1956–1957, is a testimony of his suffering from the fragmen-
tation of the individual, family, and country. He merges Kierkegaard’s “sickness
unto death” (Mou 2015, 202, 210, 234) and Buddhist “Samadhi of commiseration”
into an existential lapse out of nothingness and then confirms his “verification” of
“the clear original mind”, of “the innate wisdom for enlightenment”, in short, the
Confucian sense of Conscience, “Heavenly mind as the substance of benevolence”
天心仁體 (ibid., 241, translation slightly modified). Mou thus searches for a re-
connection to Confucian resources to repair his sense of rupture.

Tang’s view seems less catastrophic. His expression, “watching the immense sky at
loss, crying with the wind” in the preface to *The Spiritual Value of Chinese Culture*
(1979), is already a profound lamentation. However, without being pessimistic,
Tang usually uses positive terms to encourage others, like him, in despair. His
response to the turmoil he and China experienced lies in the analysis of the his-
torical and cultural problems that the country encountered. In contrast to the
commonly held sense of crisis presented by Chinese intellectuals since the late
19th century (Metzger 1977, 49), Tang represents a defence of the Confucian
value system. Thomas Metzger later calls this specific attitude “epistemological
optimism” (Metzger 2005, 259). But Thomas Fröhlich notes that “Tang’s modern
Confucianism is not naively optimistic”, but “a substantial reconciliation of all inner contradictions in modern societies” (Fröhlich 2017, 67). A typical opinion can be seen in *Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit* (1974): the suffering due to the various political shocks that China experienced is not limited to the political field, but also embraces the consequences of the cultural shocks that came with the arrival of Western modernity. His diagnosis leads to the recognition of cultural identity, particularly derived from Confucianism. The way forward is dialectical: one should admit one’s own evil and sin (the moment of in-itself) in order to assume the other’s (the moment of for-the-other), so that the transformative sympathy for self and the other could be rendered possible (the moment of for-itself). The conflict produced from the encounter of Chinese culture with world culture is not a conflict between Good and Evil, but one between different aspects of the Good (Tang 1974, 274). Tang’s dialectics tries to conserve these various aspects of the Good to form a harmonious synthesis. The aim is to form a new cultural identity that is synthetically Chinese. The foundation of modern free and democratic states lies on the political consciousness that can manage the dialectical relations among individuals, society, and the state. In Tang’s own language, it’s the humanistic spirit that can provide the foundation of values for humanity. This is Tang’s reply to the huge rupture that China suffered during his lifetime.

To make this more explicit, I will quote two of Tang’s famous metaphors: the dispersion of flowers and fruits (hua-guo piao-ling 花果飄零) and self-planting of the spiritual root (ling-gen zi-zhi 靈根自植). As a botanical metaphor, dispersion of flowers and fruits refers to the experience of exile: out of their homeland, the people live in a foreign place without a strong sense of integrity. Tang’s metaphor can describe himself living in Hong Kong under British colonial authority as well as others in exile either in Hong Kong, America or elsewhere. Feeling alienated is a common characteristic among such people, while the process of settling in a new place is a difficult one of recovery, both physical and psychological. “Self-planting of spiritual root” sketches the attempt to draw resources from this new land to wait for new shoots of growth.¹ Being rooted, originally indicating the status of being at home,² now means metonymically the conservation of value. Overcoming the sense of despair and spiritual slavery, with this metaphor Tang encourages self-confidence and self-respect. Again, his dialectical reasoning deals with an issue of faith, a belief that just like in a man suffering a grave sickness there will appear in the hope for survival, or that with the heavy sense of guilt one feels there

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¹ The relation of the root with the flower is usually taken as that of the past with the future (see Bachelard 1948, 291).

² A root is a commonly used metaphor to indicate one’s home, but it also involves more complicated considerations (see Wampole 2016, 21).
will appear a wish for the Ultimate Good (Tang 1975, 47). Out of the deep despair that comes when facing extreme danger, there arises a strong desire and hope for life. The experience of encountering such limitations is a trial of faith, and thus the inner motivation for the self-planting of a spiritual root comes from the dialectics of despair and hope. Tang not only keeps a religious tone similar to Mou’s, but also holds that the consciousness of value as the root that enables growth is based on Confucian faith. The hope to resettle oneself in a new environment is based on the belief that humanity itself is a universal ideal. This faith in humanity is for Tang the central idea of Confucianism.

Although both these philosophers defend Confucianism, they are by no means conservative, without any new contributions to this ancient doctrine. For Mou, being fully aware of the inner resistance of Chinese culture against the challenges of modernity (in the form of scientific knowledge and political systems), gives a transformative proposition to renew Confucianism. He admits the necessity of democracy and freedom to building new political institutions, and suggests a new model of politics in relation to morals. The direct connection of self-cultivation (nei-sheng 内聖) and outer ruling (wai-wang 外王), i.e. morality and politics, stated as a traditional model in The Great Learning, should now retain a radical dissociation by allowing an objective intervention, such as through science and democracy. Tang admits that China’s failure to develop democracy is due to cultural reasons and the actual conditions of the country. His strategy is to mediate the contradictions caused by culture shock and to attune human efforts (including the desire for power or will to power) to moral values. In presupposing the conflict between politics and morality, he proposes a comprehensive theory of culture to find a balance. In the examples of Tang and Mou, we see the transformation of personal trauma into a cultural diagnosis in order to create the possibility of revival. The rupture caused by diaspora brings out the effort to reconnect the disrupted continuity. However tragic it was, the inscription of discontinuity may provide us with some clues to new thinking in the 21st century. We are thus in a position to consider their efforts to make a connection by way of their experience of rupture. This is the reason why I attempt to reposition this heritage left by Tang and Mou in the current work.

Dissemination and Reterritorialization

One clue is the topological usage of the words “position” and “reposition”. The feeling of being “outlandish” (unheimisch) is attached to a certain place characterized by geographical difference. In the discourses of the two philosophers, what
is more evident is the historical interruption. There is a shift from emplacement to historicity. By looking back to the historical moments or reconstruction, Tang and Mou draw a picture of a future China, one contrary to their contemporary reality. Through this future ideal China is treated with a tone of hope. It is a mixture of the “ought to be” and the “will be”, of ideality and normativity. Seen in this way, the present moment in history is suspended by a rupture. This present is overlapped by a more authentic moment which can lead to curing the trauma and recovering integrity in the future, all in keeping conformity with the origin. This dialectical style of discourse can explain the momentary negative status. The remedy to this tremendous rupture is to rebuild a sense of unity, unity in and through history. It is exactly here that lies a discrepancy between the topological, geographical perspective and the temporal, historical perspective.

**Potency of Difference in the Resettlement**

For Tang, establishing cultural identity is key to healing the wound. All the conflicts are dialectically temporary and momentary, existing only for the present moment. In the long run, history will find a way to manage the huge rifts. The problem, for him, is to offer an image of One history with One orientation. This teleological speculation is called the “ideal of the public and the universal”. Tang uses the image of a river to assert this identity: “All the rivers in the world, wherever they are, despite the curved fold, will necessarily be guided by gravity and flow into the immense sea” (Tang 1975, 51–52). It is understandable why Tang assimilates the suffering with the rift and tries to erase the locality (“wherever they are”) and particularity. Geographical heterogeneity is thus replaced by historical identity.

But Tang himself offers another possible reading. The condition of the “self-planting of the spiritual root” is to keep one’s faith “in whatever environment”. Tang has in mind the absolute free will that is not to be conditioned by any place, any status, or any profession. The authentic man is the one who can hold self-determination and keep his own identity anywhere he goes. The expression “anywhere” is ambivalent. In one sense, it could mean that this person is detached from the present situation, as if he lived in a transcendental kingdom of freedom. In another sense, it could also mean that one should adapt oneself to the present environment. In the latter sense, the adaptation requires a realistic and particular understanding of

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3 In a Heideggerian conception of *ek-stasis*, historicity is essentially ecstatic (ek-static). The existential character of a historical being, such as the human *Dasein*, is constantly in a status of being out of place.
one’s own present situation, *hic et nunc*. The topological condition for a real, existing person will not be easily cancelled. Otherwise, there is no reason to mourn for diaspora and the loss of one’s own home. On the one hand, the historicity manifests the condition of cultural identity that determines how one necessarily belongs to one’s cultural motherland. On the other hand, free will manifests the right and power of one to choose where to live. In the linkage of historical necessity and geographical freedom, the antinomy of freedom and necessity finds a new form. In fact, for survival to be possible, for the revival to be hoped for, there must be a place for exiles to live in.

This locus is significant for keeping the separation (between Communist China and free, Nationalist Taiwan or colonial Hong Kong, etc.), because it is the place where Tang’s hope can really be preserved. The New Asia College that Tang established was the place where he spent the rest of his life working to expand his faith. This school is a new territory for the real settlement, so that the spiritual ideal can be located. Through this alternative reading, we can see that the self-planting of a spiritual root is in fact a replanting in a new territory. To exist anywhere will inevitably incur displacement. There is a condition of (re-)emplacement for thinking, for philosophizing.

**Dissemination, Borrowing Derrida**

In the cases of Tang and Mou, we have seen that the reconstruction of historical identity attempts to overcome the experience of rupture by returning to the origin. The challenge of modernity for Chinese culture calls for a correction to respond to this challenge. Mou works out a genealogy of Confucianism to shape the authentic moral principle in order to prove the historical continuity descending from Confucius and Mencius, through Song-Ming neo-Confucianism, to contemporary New Confucianism. All the rifts lead to designating the obstacle of this continuity. Tang’s picture of neo-Confucianism is different, but still very similar to Mou’s. However, the real problem is that these rifts could not be absorbed into one and the same history. There exists a certain supplement to this version of a single history. It could be argued that there are not only various versions of Chinese history, but also many “Chinese” histories, all depends on how one defines the term “Chinese”. The semantic cross-section of “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” leads to the same problem.

One possible way to shake the conviction that there is a continuous identity in conformity to the cultural origin is to adopt a perspective of heterogeneity and difference. My strategy is to point out the aspect of supplementary difference. In
his concept of *différance*, seen as “primordial supplementation”, Jacques Derrida evokes the “supplement of origin” (*supplément d’origine*) (Derrida 1967, 98; [1973, 88]) to criticize the theory of representation in Edmund Husserl. In the phenomenology of time, Husserl conceives every moment as a living present (*eine lebendige Gegenwart*), which is the presence of the origin as repetition. But for Derrida, this presence is never integral, since every present is open for the moment to come and also pushed into the past. There is neither full presence of the origin nor its pure repetition. The incomplete presence requires a supplement, that is, something different from the origin.

In his book *Dissemination* (1972 [1981]), Derrida evokes Nietzsche’s concept of contingency, derived from the experience of casting dice. He thus reformulates the concept of *différance*, as follows:

> The present can only present itself as such by relating back to itself; it can only aver itself by severing itself, only reach itself if it breaches itself, (com)plying with itself in the angle, along a break [*brisure*] (...). Presence is never present. (ibid. 1972, 336; [1981, 302–3])

The non-identical presence shows the inner breach as fundamental reflexivity. The act of self-reference must involve a temporal duration. Derrida continues to ascribe this differing to the concept of history:

> What holds for the present here also holds for “history”, “form”, the form of history, etc., along with all the significations that, in the language of metaphysics, are indissociable from the signification: “present”. (ibid. 1972, 336; [1981, 303])

Self-identity always concerns a difference that postpones the closure of the self. Historical and cultural identity leaves space to the other, to the non-original.

The difference offers another origin which splits, cuts, and breaks. Another origin will be a beginning for another new life. Derrida applies the logic of supplement to equate presence with life. The dynamics of spreading seeds or insemination are “the scission, the decision—which is both deciding and decided”, that is, “exit out of the ‘primitive’ mythical unity”. The dissemination is necessary because “Nothing is complete in itself, and it can only be completed by what it lacks” (ibid. 1972, 337; [1981, 304]). *Différance* or supplement can explain the diversification in life: no diversity, no life. The origin itself is plural. The supplement to the origin will not decide the consequent development. Ramification and blossoming will also mean diversification. To disseminate seeds, similar to casting dice, is to spread contingency.
Let’s go back to Tang’s metaphor of diaspora. When the seeds fall on the land, there is no voluntary decision, but rather arbitrary distribution. The dissemination is the product of contingence. It depends on the reception of the land. The diversity of the places determines the new forms of life. The botanic metaphor of life resorts to the land as receptacle. The new territory makes possible the production of a new form of life. For life to continue, it requires the contingent emergence of different new forms, instead of repeating the old ones. Thus understood, Tang’s conservatism could reveal a rather different requirement for creating a new form of life in self-conservation (self-respect), without falling into the simple repetition of the old form from motherland.

Reterritorialization: New Territory of Concepts

If it’s possible to borrow the concept of dissemination to induce the positive condition of diaspora and resettlement, it’s also possible to consider the creativity of valuable life as another condition of thought. With regard to the ambivalence of Tang’s expression of “everywhere” (a sense of loss or sense of freedom), we have already clarified an alternative reading of his metaphor of self-conservation by introducing the topological condition. Yet the concept of place is not only instructive to notify the hidden presupposition of the origin, it confers a series of concepts, such as home, place, territory, land, and earth, in philosophizing. To adopt the idea of geophilosophy, we can see how philosophy as conceptual creation involves the territorial change. According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work, *What is Philosophy?* (1991 [1994]), philosophical concepts emerge from the plane of immanence, which is not empirical:

> it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and the instituting of the plane are required, like two wings or fins. (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 44; [1994, 41])

A concept has its own claim by right (*quid juris, en droit*). The contingence of philosophical creation depends however on the land as territorial condition. Deleuze and Guattari hold that philosophical thinking by concepts “takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (ibid. 1991, 82; [1994, 85]). The primordial effect of geophilosophy is deterritorialization: “the earth constantly carries out a movement of deterritorialization on the spot, by which it goes beyond any territory: it is deterritorializing and deterritorialized” (ibid.). But
this movement working on the territory is never single ended. It is dynamic and constantly moving, so that the creation of the concept follows the track of this movement. At certain moments it arrives at some particular territories to “take place”, or using a Deleuzian term, to meet its plane of immanence on a certain land. The typical performance of this procedure is the Greek origin of philosophy.

Ancient Greece is the territory where the immanence of concept happens to take place. Deterritorialization accompanies reterritorialization:

Movements of deterritorialization are inseparable from territories that open onto an elsewhere; and the process of reterritorialization is inseparable from the earth, which restores territories. Territory and earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility, deterritorialization (from territory to the earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to territory). (ibid.)

For Deleuze and Guattari, the origin of Western philosophy is contingent, due to “an encounter between the Greek milieu and the plane of immanence of thought” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 89; [1994, 93]). In contrast, the thinking that takes place in Chinese, Indian, Jewish and Islamic lands happens only through figures and not concepts; so Deleuze and Guattari take these thoughts as pre-philosophical. After the period of Ancient Greece, the encounter happens for a second time in modern Europe. Curiously enough, a third time will perhaps arrive in the future:

The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples. (ibid. 1991, 104; [1994, 108])

Again, Nietzsche’s view of contingence and becoming prevails. If this formula is consistent, the process of becoming will not stop at a certain moment or a fixed place, such as modern Europe. The continuous becoming urges the creation of concepts to take place in the lands other than Europe, so that its consequence will be liable to go beyond Eurocentrism. Even at first sight, the judgment of being pre-philosophical seems to do injustice to Chinese, Indian and other traditions. The same injustice is suffered by Spain and Italy, as they are not included in this second moment of encounter due to lacking a philosophical milieu. In fact, the process of becoming will call forth a new moment of creation:
Deterritorialization and reterritorialization meet in the double becoming. The Autochthon can hardly be distinguished from the stranger because the stranger becomes Autochthonous in the country of the other who is not, at the same time that the Autochthon becomes stranger to himself, his class, his nation, and his language (…). (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 105; [1994, 110])

When the usage of certain concepts loses its freshness and creativity, there is a detachment from the plane of immanence. So there is a need to deterritorialize again. If the moment of strangeness falls on a certain land to project the plane again, then a new reterritorialization will occur.

This is the possibility to escape from the cliché about the legitimacy of Chinese (or Taiwanese) philosophy. Admittedly, there was no similar origin of philosophy in Asia as in Ancient Greece, but this does not hinder the invention of a philosophical tradition on the plane of immanence. However, I have no intention to project a new nation or new land. My aim will be only to open the space for transforming the topological significance in the botanic metaphor of diaspora and resettlement into a consideration of creative differentiation.

Transvaluation of Conceptual Appropriation

Anyone who reads the work of Tang will admit that his metaphor aims to motivate Chinese cultural identity. The geographical condition of rupture is inscribed in Tang’s philosophical argument. The ideal of correcting things is to clarify the Confucian humanistic spirit, by infusing axiological conservatism which incorporates the practical philosophy of self-respect based on free will. Tang’s argumentation is in fact a mixture of Kant and Hegel, adapting the Hegelian dialectics in treating the historical coherence.

Similarly, Mou’s Philosophy of History (1982a) obviously adapts a Hegelian framework. But in this book, while distinguishing “analytical rational spirit” (fenjiede jinli jin-shen 分解的盡理精神), “synthetic rational spirit” (zonghede jinli jingshen 綜合的盡理精神), and “synthetic energetic spirit” (zonghede jinqi jingshen 綜合的盡氣精神)⁴, he engages the Kantian distinction of analytic/synthetic and

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⁴ Because of the lack of comparable concepts in Western philosophy, the term qi is very difficult to translate into English. According to Margus Ott (2019, 321), qi is often translated as life-breath, even though it is not limited to animate beings. Many scholars also translate it as “matter” or “material force”. However, qi can also pertain to immaterial spheres, and it is doubtful, on the other hand, whether there are any other forces as the material ones. According to the current understanding in physics, matter and energy are equivalent, and in order to avoid the term “matter” here, which
rational/empirical. The terms, “extensional presentation” or “presentation concerning the contents” of reason, have the trace of Aristotelian logic. In Mou’s old age, the emphasis lies on absorption and transformation of Kant. A pivotal expression appears in his critique of the “metaphysics of morals” of Kant, in order to invent his own vocabulary “moral metaphysics” (Mou 1981, 136). As for the famous term “immanent transcendence”, arguably contested by Roger Ames, the aim is to state the proposition “the connection of heavenly principle with the moral nature (tian-dao xing-ming xiang-guan-tong 天道性命相貫通)”. Mou thus creates the term “onto-cosmology”. Mou’s final synthesis reconciles Chinese and Western philosophy through the path of Kant, reformulating a picture of the history of Chinese philosophy, as in Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (1999) and Fourteen Lectures on the Convergence of Chinese and Western Philosophy (1996). Through his critical reading of Kant, Mou holds a Fichtean position and proposes a transvaluation of Chinese philosophy. Using intellectual intuition as the key concept to reach the Thing-in-Itself, Mou’s approach goes beyond the limit of knowledge set by Kant, for whom the metaphysical illusion is due to the dislocation of concepts of reason out of the realm of empirical knowledge. Mou’s usage of intellectual intuition is not epistemological but instead moral. This intellectual intuition, a synonym of the conscience (“innate moral knowing” liangzhi 良知), is seen as the foundation of moral metaphysics. But Mou’s ambition is not limited to the renaissance of Confucianism, it extends to Taoist and Buddhist philosophy. That’s why he terms his effort as a “convergence of Chinese and Western philosophy”.

The idea of convergence or reconciliation (hui-tong 會通) reflects the long-term effort of Asian intellectuals confronting the challenge of modernity. It presupposes a critical examination of philosophical traditions, a method borrowed from Tian-Tai and Hua-Yen Buddhism, pan-jiao 判教. When a variety of Buddhist schools arrived China, the monks needed to classify the different doctrines in order to organize their knowledge and orient their faith. Mou adopts the same method and applies it to evaluate philosophy in general, by putting Western and Eastern thinking on the common ground. The Buddhist concept of Mahayana perfect teaching (yuan-jiao 圓教) offers him a model to evaluate philosophical systems. Even more than a mere borrowing, the Confucian version of perfect teaching can solve, as Jason Clower puts it, “one of the great problems of all philosophy generally, namely, whether and how a perfect person is also a happy person” (Clower 2010, 181). Mou’s critical examination is thus analogous to deterritorialization and reterritorialization.
His deterritorialization is a way to extract the method of critical examination and ideal of perfect teaching from Buddhism. As a result of reterritorialization, the new territory is a complicated convergence of different systems of philosophy, those of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. A critical examination of philosophical systems allows Mou to open a field of discourse. A territory for the encounter of concepts renders possible the movement of thinking, of creating new concepts.

The question “How is intellectual intuition possible?” corresponds to Mou’s critical examination in response to Kant, in the sense that Mou affirms the “authentic self” (Mou 1980, 181–83) to establish the fundamental ontology in a Chinese way. In so doing, Mou is still conscious of the common problem in Kant and Tian-Tai Buddhism, that of existence of phenomena. In the concession to the breach between the authentic self and phenomenal self, Mou tends to play a dialectical process to include the crack into the “constitutive and benevolent heart/mind” or “authentic mind” (ben xin ren ti zhi yi qu 本心仁體之一曲) (cf. Billioud 2012, 205). The cursive path (yi-qu 一曲) means in fact a negation and implies a dialectical way of thinking. Mou uses the term “retrospective verification” (ni jue ti zheng 逆覺體證) to indicate the self-negation of this authentic heart. To justify the moral presentation of such a dialectical connection (Mou 1980, 201–2), Mou resorts to intellectual intuition by maintaining the possibility of its inner negation, while the well-known expression “self-negation of the conscience” (liangzhi kan xian 良知坎陷) sounds nonetheless more problematic. The Tian-Tai Buddhist model of perfect teaching allows him to express a “cursive paradoxical wisdom” (quxian guijue de zhihui 曲線詭譎的智慧) (ibid., 322) that can dissolve the contradiction in intellectual intuition. Starting with the Kantian problem, by way of Heideggerian fundamental ontology, admitting negation and paradox through the Buddhist model, and finally arriving at a justification of intellectual intuition as a value concept, Mou thus shows a sinuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

In contrast with Mou’s interest in Tian-Tai Buddhism, Tang’s mode of thinking shows an affinity with Hua-yen Buddhism. Tang’s arrangement of nine horizons

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5 Though the term “fundamental ontology” is borrowed from Martin Heidegger, Mou surpasses Heidegger’s determination while ignoring the ontological difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiende). Mou’s critique states that Heidegger commits a mistake of metaphysical misplacement (Mou 1980, 355). Mou argues that “the fundamental ontology can only be founded on fundamental mind (benxin 本心), mind of Dao (daoxin 道心), or authentic mind (zhencangxin 真常心)” (ibid., 347). Sébastien Billioud gives a profound discussion on the usage of fundamental ontology and extends it to a contrast between Mou Zongsan and Emmanuel Levinas (Billioud 2012, 139–60).

6 See also Mou’s expression “establishing the perfect teaching paradoxically” 詭譎地建立圓教 (Mou 1997, 895, 1008–13).
(jing 境) also incarnates the critical examination of doctrines. Tang’s last book, *Life Existence and Horizons of Mind* (1986), represents an example of the systematic classification of doctrines. The first four horizons are set to explain the phenomenal world. The fifth concerns the abstract episteme, while the sixth deals with moral life in general (*Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*). The last three horizons arrange three major religions in a successive order: Monotheism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Putting Confucianism on the last horizon seems to be a result of the bias imposed by Tang’s faith. But in addition to the reason stated by Tang to praise the Confucianism ideal of humanistic common living, the last horizon reflects Tang’s search for cultural identity, which is his ultimate concern.

The intention of reorganizing the world as a value system is never a straight reductive arrangement for Tang. His cursive and complicated way lies in the request for a comprehensive understanding of the world full of heterogeneous values. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization involve a process of transvaluation that also takes place in the interreligious dialogue. The pivot mechanism of the development of horizons stems from a traditional concept for *gan-tong* 感通 (resonance, affective communication, empathy …) functioning in three directions (vertical, horizontal, successive) (Tang 1986, vol.1: 17). Behind Tang’s idealism there is a realist dimension, i.e. a topological condition, to motivate the interaction of mind and horizon. Using the Hua-yen Buddhist terms and scope, Tang transforms the meaning of mind and horizon into a modern picture of the world, including science and ethico-political activities. Admittedly, his main purpose is to motivate a dialogue among religious values, and the ascription of each religion to its own horizon reflects his intention of converging the various aspects of the Good, without jumping into the trap of religious battles or competition among values. Tang also demarcates the line between philosophy and religion by setting a limit on the infinite regression. In so doing, he deterritorializes philosophy and religion at the same time; on the one hand, philosophy needs the orientation in values proposed by religion, on the other hand, religion needs the philosophical clarification to recognize its proper domain. The teaching (*jiao* 教), in the sense of cultivation, combines philosophy and religion together, so that Tang reterritorializes these two again in the establishment of horizons.

The mind in Tang’s view is similar to Mou’s “constitutive and benevolent heart”, coloured by idealism. The horizons are for the mind to move in and out. Whenever the mind might displace itself, there is always a topological requirement: to be in its own place, to be in the right place (*ge-dang-qi-wei* 各當其位). The place here means metaphorically a positioning of value. While enveloping the moral disposition, the mind shall reterritorialize itself in a certain horizon. Between right and wrong, higher and lower value, the mind decides in a dynamic way. The
concept projected by the mind guides this movement. This dynamic process constitutes the way in which Tang conceives the world, after his suffering of exile. Reterritorialization produces a new world, which is to be considered from a different perspective of horizon, place, space, and territory. The nine horizons can be taken as a transformation of the world through the matrix of dynamic resonance of affection. The conceptual apparatus reflects his model of resettlement (self-planting of the spiritual root), but the new root is not a miniature of Hong Kong where he spends the rest of his life, nor an imaginary projection of a future world. The mind surpasses the threshold of Tang’s homeland and overarches the cultural territories so that a mixture of world picture is forged. One moment of mental act can bring forth nine horizons. The movement circulating nine horizons is enfolding and unfolding, enveloping and developing at the same moment. The physical space and distance can’t limit movement of the mind while the mind realizes the constant becoming. Being attached to the emplacement, the interaction between mind and horizon (the typical function of affective communication) responds to the becoming, which means the movement of thinking. Here the concept of becoming is a key moment to connect different traditions. The horizon (jing 眷), a term originating from Buddhism, worked through the Confucian apparatus of affectivity based on the Book of Changes, seems to function as the plane of immanence defined by Deleuze and Guattari. Tang’s conceptual manipulation has the potential to absorb the other systems and transform them into a new comprehensive type. As a philosopher, Tang’s effort in establishing a comprehensive system of value can be considered as an effect of resettlement, of reterritorialization.

Both Tang and Mou have appropriated the Buddhist model of critical examination to create new conditions of thinking. Such appropriation allows them to overcome the trauma of historical and geographical rupture. Their hope is to find a new possibility for the future. Since these conditions are topologically realized, in Hong Kong or Taiwan, their physical bodies create new connections with new lands. The places of resettlement are for them more like supplements to their homeland. But with the geographical separation (for example, due to the Taiwan Strait), there lies a zone of security to prevent these places from being absorbed, reduced, and forgotten. These unfamiliar, overseas islands reformulate a new image different from old imaginings of their home country. Their effort in interpreting traditional doctrines affects all the younger generations. For good or for bad, Tang and Mou are paradigms that are representative of a generation strongly influenced by World War II and the Chinese civil war. Immersed in Chinese traditional resources, engaging in a cross-traditional dialogue, and creating new usage of philosophical terms, all these efforts form the heritage that we receive from Tang and Mou.
Conclusion

The trauma that Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan experienced made them search for a way to confront history and overcome historical rupture. They thus ask for an original, healthy organism of culture based on Confucian values. In such a metonymic action, the idea of a personal cure is displaced by philosophical therapy, which is a self-transformation by restoring the vital energy. Their philosophizing involves a movement of thinking. The cure is actually not a pure return to the original, but rather a reconstruction. Mou constructs a fresh new origin of Chinese metaphysics by using a Kantian term (intellectual intuition). Tang constructs a world (system of horizons) to reconcile the conflicts of modernity, of faiths, of East and West, and of nations. A new origin of Confucian humanism is also a result of construction. Instead of saying that the origin was already there, it would be better to confirm a regressive recognition. Philosophy is ascribed a metonymic function to activate an imagination of living dynamics, to metaphorically cure the living organism. In giving a new form of life, philosophy, in the hands of Tang and Mou, brings in something heterogeneous to the original organism. Not only some Western philosophers, but the whole tradition of Western philosophy is transplanted onto Chinese tradition. The recognition of origin takes place where there are different factors. Once the apparatus is triggered, the recognized origin should coexist with other origins. The die is cast, more than once, twice ... The dissemination transfers the possibilities upon various fragments of the earth. The experience of exile, seen as the effect of deterritorialization, is transformed into the motivation of the creation of concepts. Whatever their personal intentions may be, the movement of concepts becomes impersonal. Their efforts become part of the heritage of Taiwan and Hong Kong: a reterritorialization as a supplement to origin.

The experience of thought in Tang and Mou is of course precious. The recreation of cultural identity must take into consideration the existence of historical rupture and geographical rift. This experience is in fact inscribed in the history to come, in the new world under reformation. There is a shift in perspective, and the supplement to origin displaces the standpoint by integrating a new framework to embrace the becoming of the world. Deterritorialization belongs to the world event. Without knowing Deleuze and Derrida as their contemporaries, Tang and Mou lived in and through their rifts, but this does not prevent their philosophical concepts from emerging from the same plane of immanence. The experiences of diaspora and thought can join together and find a new mark in world geography. The coexistence of philosophers from different places, from different generations, shows the possibility of forming a common world to live in together. In such a
world, the locality is never an abstract point in a system of coordination, but rather a constitutive factor for the integration of all the experiences. Locality sustains the effects of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Disseminative contingences enrich the diversity of all kinds of creation, especially to contribute to philosophical creation.

Reference